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Theoretical knowledge, freedom 
and constraints in architectural design 
Mir Azimzadeh 
Architectural design, when it is possible, 
happens in a social context which paradoxically set limits to it. 
Transcending these limits means nothing 
than changing the society through design. 
The involvement of analytically theoretical knowledge 
m accordance with the nature of design 
would explain this intricate process. 
In Buildings andpowerTh.omas A. Markus concludes that 
...architects may have to design by 'subversion'. That is, 
use their unique professional skills at a level which only they 
can fully grasp. This involves interpretations of the brief, 
finding forms and creating spatial structures which either 
now, or in the future, will open as many doors as possible 
rowards shared power relations and freedom for bonds to 
develop. Such properties will be beyond the apparent 
demands of the brief. 
(Markus 1993, p. 318, my emphasis). 
I will take this statement as a point of departure to discuss 
three questions: a/\iarchitectural and urban design, treated 
as a practice that aims to affect the life of people in an 
intended way, is possible at all; b I i f it is possible, how and 
where can we search for the source of freedom and restric-
tions in design; and c/what is the role of theoretical know-
ledge in the practise of design. In order to deal with these 
questions I would like to review some current views about 
the social position of architects, architecture, and architec-
tural knowledge and theories. 
I begin with Markus' explicit encouragement to archi-
tects. He stresses the word 'subversion' to imply the feasi-
bility of his suggestion even in situations where there is no 
leeway for architects to act with reciprocal understanding 
between them and their clients, or in circumstances where 
there is no possibility for them to assume a pedagogical role 
in relation to their client (ibid.). Defining the professional 
task of architects in this way involves a kind of social and 
ethical commitment. But one may also suspect that this 
way of viewing the profession assigns a superior social posi-
tion to architects which may seem to be illusory and unrea-
listic. I will evaluate Thomas Markus' position by reviewing 
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critical studies o f concrete instances where the architect has 
actually aimed at affecting the life o f people through archi-
tectural design. 
The interpretation of the brief 
The assumption that the architect is best qualified to inter-
pret the requirements and activities which are to be accom-
modated i n a bui lding, from the point o f view o f their i m -
plications for the shape and form of the bui lding has been 
questioned by Jan Ake Granath. He criticises 
architects' tendency to totalise architecture and to see their 
own role as far more comprehensive than either architecture 
as such or architects' knowledge warrants 
(Granath 1991, p. 45) 
Granath defines totalising architecture as a reductionistic 
view i n that the architect tries to fit the subject o f design 
into his limited conceptual universe. To make his argument, 
Granath refers to a study conducted by Robert Gutman 
about a major work by Louis Kahn. According to Gutman, 
Kahn was "a fervent believer i n the architect's ability to 
'transform the life style' o f his buildings' inhabitants and 
users" (Granath 1991, p. 46). 
Louis Kahn has designed the Richards Research Labora-
tories at the University o f Pennsylvania. Immense disagree-
ments appeared between Kahn and the user, i.e. the staff o f 
the labs. Many changes were made in the design despite o f 
Kahn's disapproval and the completed bui lding was further 
altered after i t was occupied. Nevertheless, the Director o f 
rhe laboratories continued to consider the bui lding as an 
impediment to the progress o f medical science, because o f 
its gross inadequacies from the viewpoint o f those who had 
to use i t . 
O n the other hand the architectural community defended 
Kahn and admired h i m for his work (Granath 1991, p. 48). 
Kahn himself contended that his original design, treated as 
a work o f architecture and not simply evaluated in terms o f 
bui lding performance, represented the real Richards 
Laboratories. Khan claimed that he could better interpret 
the true aspirations o f the inst itution than the user o f the 
facility. Kahn makes a distinction between desires and 
needs. According to Kahn, desires and aspirations, which 
can not be seen and expressed explicitly by the users, should 
be explored and fulfilled by architects. Kahn believes that 
understanding the essence o f the inst i tut ion is paramount i n 
the work o f architects. Granath considers Kahn's view both 
elitist and moralistic. He writes 
Kahn sees an architect's mission to be to design buildings 
that wi l l improve the quality of life - something the 'institu-
tion' desires, but that clients are not able to fathom 
(Granath 1991 p.47) 
Kahn asserts that architects must influence the formulation 
of the programs to adapt them to the architect's ideal o f the 
building's form. One may draw a parallel between Kahn's 
view and Markus' suggestion of'seeking properties beyond 
the apparent demand o f the b r i e f . 
As the designer o f the Richards Laboratories, Kahn is 
accused o f excluding people - that is o f not taking into 
account the members o f the organisation in his design. 
Granath writes: 
Thus, Kahn totalised architecture to such an extent that he 
not only considered his architectural creation to be the 
Richards Laboratories, to the exclusion of both people who 
work in the Richards Laboratories as an organisation and the 
work they perform, he also contended that no matter what 
these people did or what their work required, nothing can 
change the essential character of the Richards Laboratories, 
namely the essence he divined in his original design 
(ibid.) 
This accusation has been made against Kahn, though his 
manifest aim was to improve the quality o f life o f the people 
he had excluded - i.e. to fulfi l aspirations and desires, that 
he believed they could not see and express. 
The building o f Richards Laboratories may be considered 
as an unsuccessful work o f architecture from the point o f 
view that it has neither satisfied the architect nor rhe clients 
and the users. What might have happened i f Kahn had 
limited himself to the needs o f the clients and the users as 
expressed in the program, instead of treating the program as a 
poor starting point for the architectural design o f the bui l -
ding? A t any rate, the program was supposed to be transfor-
med to some thingother than a text. For the moment, we may 
call this some other thing forms and spatial structures', to apply 
the same words used in my initial quote from Markus. These 
forms and spatial structures would, of course, convey some 
unique values - i.e. values which break w i t h precedent. 
132 NORDISK ARKITEKTURFORSKNING 1998:4 
I believe that the transformation in the sense mentioned 
above could not be merely a technical process, i.e. a process 
of extracting form out of the program. Markus discusses 
how, up to mid-eighteenth century prescriptive texts such 
as briefs and design guides refer to and establish classes of 
hierarchically assembled spaces. Since such classifications 
determine the types of space and their relations in terms of 
clustering, they 'design', buildings before a designer is 
involved. He shows how, for example, a map of industrial 
relations is translated into material forms. This is in fact a 
process of producing buildings, or at most, of reproducing 
'architecture' as a prevalent cultural value. By contrast, con-
temporary architects and architectural theorists are more 
inclined to consider the process as a creative one. We may 
guess that clients who chose architects such as Kahn also 
assume that in designing the building their architect will 
create, not merely produce, something. 
I also do believe that the work process in an organisation 
and the organisation itself, and consequently the needs 
expressed in the program by the clients and the prospective 
users related to the organisation, are all concrete cases that 
can best be understood with reference to an abstract network 
of social functions and relations we call 'institutions'. Given 
this, we can see why Kahn found it fruitful, even necessary, to 
acquire knowledge about institutions. We can avoid using 
mystifying statements like understanding the essence of insti-
tutions, as Kahn uses them. We can think of approachable 
understanding of the persistent pattern of relations which 
constitutes the recognisable form of institutions. We may 
also think of exploring the latent networks of relations, say 
bonds, as Markus uses the word, which are the generators of 
forces against the rigidity of institutions, in cases where this 
rigidity fortifies a monopoly of power, or a contested rein-
forcement of power. At last we may hope that these gene-
rators can, probably, be activated thanks to the actions of 
architects — that is through creating new forms and spatial 
structures. I will examine if this hope is realistic or not. 
Granath has opposed the reductionistic view of totali-
sing architecture to a holistic view, where 
one tries to fit one's own limited view to a greater whole, 
including input from all actors and fields of knowledge 
having relevance to the building and its design 
(Granath 1991 , p. 4 8 ) 
The latter view seems to be more practical and rational. But 
neither the idea of an individual actor can be considered as 
refuted only because it meets rejection from other actors 
involved, nor the collective agreement about an idea will 
automatically make the idea appropriate to a design task. 
We know also that the concept of collective participation in 
planning or design processes does not embrace all the 
people whose life will be affected by the result of those pro-
cesses. It is imaginable that every actor may represent the 
special interest manifested in the ideology of the profes-
sional, or more generally, of the social group the actor be-
longs to. In this context it is important to know for whom 
the result of the design is intended (Granath 1991, p. 5 0 ) . 
Professional ideology 
Jerker Lundequist explains how the professional ideology 
supports the practitioners of a profession to overcome the 
inner tension in which they find themselves when they 
have to answer to the contradicting interests of the different 
sides which are related to their practice (Lundequist 1982, 
p. 2 0 7 ) . Professional ideology does not concern only the 
architectural community but also other groups like lawyers, 
physicians, engineers, etc. These groups tend to develop 
their own uniting, interest-supporting, and status-eleva-
ting ideology. By means of their own ideology, they put 
their profession beyond the social conflicts that arise accor-
ding to the essential economic and social relations in the 
society. In this way professional groups take part in the ac-
tion of regulating their own position in the intricare system 
of social power. Ideologies are not, per se, either false or 
true. They are rather action programs for a definite group 
of people to define themselves in relation to other groups or 
the whole society. The idea of totalising architecture may 
simply be associated with the formation of a professional 
ideology in the field of architecture. 
Gutman consider totalising architecture in terms of the 
gulf arising between architects and non architects when 
they judge or evaluate works of architecture. It is not 
unusual that opinions may divide during the various stages 
of design. Disagreements may appear even in post occupancy 
evaluations, which have become so popular in recent years. 
The problem is not the difference in the assessment itself. 
The question is i f assessments can have a common basis 
which is impartial with respect to different interests or 
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ideologies, and even impartial w i t h respect to the doctrines 
o f the dominating system o f power. I f consensus regarding 
rhe criteria o f our judgements and evaluations o f buildings 
cannot be reached, our only possible resource is to try to 
make these crireria analytically testable and explicit, so that 
they can be debated w i t h greatet precision. 
Thomas A . Markus discusses the new freedom i n archi-
tectural design i n a situation where form, function and space 
are no longer integrated into a publicly accepted frame 
which would otherwise have granted the shared meaning o f 
buildings. I t is no longer safe for a client, or sponsor, to 
assume anything about the outcome o f a commission. 
Markus points out that this freedom also carries a danger. 
He writes: 
the danger of the new freedom is precisely that such inno-
vatory and often highly exhilarating designs do not seem to 
be contradictory; the buildings redefine social practices by 
assigning them new (and seemingly coherent) meanings 
which are hard to reject without analysis 
(Markus 1992, p. 45) 
I n fact the danger does not lie in the freedom itself, but i n 
the obstacles which may stand i n our way i f we t ry to 
subject rhese seemingly coherent but potentially incon-
sistent and imposed meanings to some sort o f analysis. 
Markus mentions the strategies which are aimed at 
blocking such analysis. We may simply call them strategies 
that block the way towards establishing a reliable base for 
the assessment o f works o f architecture. Markus shows 
how, w i t h i n architectural debates, forms are considered as 
autonomous and free from functional connotations and 
functions are trivialised as pertaining to purely technical 
and util itarian aspects o f buildings, while space itself is ab-
sent, at least as a factor rhat may exert an influence over the 
fabric o f social relationships. The intellectual framework 
w i t h i n which much architectural debate is currently opera-
t ing makes i t impossible to analyse either form or function 
in terms of social relations. Markus also thinks that defining 
archirecture as pure art is a blocking strategy which results 
i n making the issue o f function effectively disappear 
( ibid.) .This is, i n fact, a strategy which ultimately excludes 
people from discussions o f architecture. 
Gutman claims rhat for most architects the concern w i t h 
people and the satisfaction of their needs is not primary: 
the principle interest is architecture and architecture, in the 
view of most advanced architects, at least in its manifestation 
as an art, exists in a realm by itself 
According to h i m 
architects have a tendency to concentrate on issues that are 
important to architects and architects alone 
(Granath 1991, p. 48) 
I n fact this tendency can be rooted i n and strengthened by 
the ideology o f the profession. 
Berner describes the group-integrating process o f deve-
loping a professional ideology w i t h reference to a set o f four 
idealised principles: knowledge monopoly, autonomy, 
'The W h i t e Man's Burden', and profession identification. 
According to these principles the group maintains a unique 
competence which is based on a high level o f education and 
a long process o f socialisation. The profession is considered 
as autonomous; the members o f the group themselves 
determine what should be included w i t h i n the range o f 
required professional competence. The responsibility before 
the public interest and the clients is defined by the 
colleagues and not by outsiders. Identification o f the pro-
fession is very distinct; the practitioner o f the profession 
should be formed as a person not only by acquiring the for-
mal professional knowledge but also through learning the 
dominat ing value system w i t h i n the profession. They 
should undergo a process o f 'acclimatisation' (Lundequist 
1982, pp. 208-209). 
One may interpret 'acclimatisation', more extremely, as 
a process o f indoctrination. We can conclude that the more 
the professional practice gets near this ideal type the more it 
blocks the critiques against the doctrines o f the profession 
from outsiders as well as from dissidents. 
Analytic skill 
For the purposes o f my argument, the main concern is not 
what architects claim they have a right to do or what they 
have the ambition to do, but what they can do and what they 
actually do. It is also important to me to undersrand and 
explain the effect o f theoretical knowledge on the practice o f 
architecture and, through this practice, on the life o f people. 
The absence o f analytical theory, I believe, w i l l give way to 
externally imposed restrictions that substitute social ideo-
logy for architectural creativity, (Hill ier 1996, p. 56). 
134 NORDISK ARKITEKTURFORSKNING 1998:4 
The viewpoints reviewed above lead to similar explana-
tions of how specific definitions of architecture, as a social 
practice and as a cultural phenomenon, may alienate people 
from 'the world of architects and architecture', or block any 
analyric scrutiny of how the work of architecture affects 
people's life. Despite this similarity we can clearly distin-
guish two different - not necessarily opposite - ways of 
looking at the problem of architectural knowledge or 
'unique professional skill'. 
(i) The architect's knowledge is criticised as a limited 
conceptual universe which, i f applied unchecked in the 
practice of architecture, excludes people. The belief in the 
unique knowledge and ability of the architect has been 
equated with the belief that architecture is an isolated field 
in which the work of architecture is only justified by its 
aesthetic and other values, and also the belief that the pro-
fessional community possesses a monopoly in the judge-
ment about this. 
This view of the architects' knowledge is accompanied 
by a worry that a premature application of knowledge may 
cause a misfit of the projected building to the occupant or-
ganisation, and that this misfit will lead to either dysfunc-
tion of the building or the stagnation of the organisation 
(Granath 1991, p. 4 9 ) . Granath warns of making rhe same 
mistake that Kahn did in the case of Richards laboratories. 
To escape this situation , Granath advocates the integra-
tion of different kinds of knowledge within the practice of 
design, by stressing on the synergetic effects of this integra-
tion (Granath 1991 , p. 25) . This suggestion entails that de-
sign should be considered as a collective process which 
engages the whole collective in the act of design; "all parti-
cipants in a design process are designers" (Granath 1 9 9 2 , 
P- 235)-
Claes Caldenby proposes two criteria that apply to our 
identification of any work of architecture: it should be a 
distinguishable object, and an architectural achievement 
should be distinguishable in it. He admits that these criteria 
may imply a discrimination against routine work which 
leads to ordinary buildings , e.g. planning or many kinds of 
rebuilding work (Caldenby 1994 , p. 71) , (see also Klarqvist 
1994 , p. 15, and Jormakka 1994 , p. 4 9 ) . The difference of 
process design as contrasted to project design has preoccu-
pied many architects that have reflected on the practice of 
architecture (Holmdahl 1992, p. 275) . I have tried to circum-
vent this problem by focusing mosrly, on the relation of 
specific theoretical knowledge and skill to design, no matter 
whether this knowledge and skill are applied by an indi-
vidual or a collective, and no matter whether the emergence 
of architecture is conceived as a result of a continuous and 
proceduralized design process or as a result of a discontinuous 
creative design process. 
The consideration of all participants of the design pro-
cess as designers can explain the resistant endeavours to 
develop norms and methods of action that would facilitate 
communication, without thinking so much of the content 
of the communication i.e. the things which are supposed to 
be communicated. Less effort has been put into the work of 
making the content of communication, say specialised 
knowledge, scientifically communicable. All concern has 
been focussed on communication itself, which is conside-
red as the generator of knowledge needed for action. There 
is, in fact, some risk here for a mutation of communication 
into a process of compromise, which depends, practically, 
on the interest of limited group of actors and the balance of 
power. 
( 2 ) In the second way of looking at architectural know-
ledge no necessary connection is drawn between the idea of 
'unique professional skill' and the idea of professional 
monopoly in judgements about architecture, i.e. actual 
exclusion of non-architects in estimating archirecture. In 
this context, the word 'skill' does not denote only craftsman 
skill or dexterity, but it embraces, more comprehensively , 
both theoretical knowledge and practical skill. Markus 
talks specifically about 'analytical skills'. These skills i f 
acquired 
put - and keep - (the architect) well ahead of the layperson 
in understanding meaning. It may consist of a richer, 
perhaps even ambiguous, interpretation of the brief... 
(Markus 1991 , p. 318) 
This may be associated with Kahn's ambition to "interpret 
the true aspirations of the institution" (Granath 1991, p. 4 6 ) . 
In spite of stressing the uniqueness of the professional 
skill, this skill is not mystified. It is thought to arise from 
the ability to conduct analysis, and its result, the work of 
architecture, is supposed to be open to analysis. Here archi-
tectural knowledge is not imprisoned in the 'limited con-
ceptual universe' of the privileged practitioner of the pro-
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fession. I t is supposed to depend on analytic theory. As 
Hil l ier states, " w i t h analytic theory, the debate over archi-
tectural ends is an open debate, w i thout i t , a concealed 
paradigm" (Hil l ier 1996, p. 443). 
Architecture, as Swedish architecture critic O l o f H u l t i n 
defines i t , is not the architect's private affair ( H u l t i n 1991, 
pp. 7—8). A work o f art is a presentation o f structures o f 
feelings. I t is the artist's individual expression. A n architec-
tural design is not merely a work o f art i n this sense. I t is not 
only a representation o f something, rather a thing itself, an 
object; a social object that is to be experienced, undersrood 
and used by people (Hil l ier 1996, p. 64) 
The hope is not abandoned that architectural innova-
t ion , emanated from the architect's 'analytical skil l ' , may 
enhance humanistic dimensions o f social relations. Markus 
points out that the map o f social relation is mul t id imen-
sional. He counts characteristic dimensions like: power-
bonds; closed - open; constrained - free; hierarchical pyra-
mids - non hierarchical nets; centripetal - centrifugal; co-
operative - competitive; conforming — subversive; traditional 
- innovative; t ightly defined - loosely articulated; produc-
tive - existential; local (and spatial) - global (and trans-
spatial); institutional - negotiated; or central - peripheral 
(Markus 1992, p. 47). These dimensions should, cont inu-
ously, be le-examined not only for assessing social relations 
and design programs from a humanistic point o f view, but, 
primarily, for providing a guideline for architectural design 
and a measure for estimating the result o f i t f rom the broa-
der point o f view o f social relationships and cultural values. 
This entails, o f course knowledge about the mechanism 
through which social relations (people) relate to architec-
ture. 
Architectural theories 
The important question is how to improve this knowledge 
so as to also neutralise the 'blocking strategies', which h i n -
der analytical inquiry into archirecture and its, scientifi-
cally tractable, impact on social life. Here, the theory o f ar-
chitecture is at issue. M a n y endeavours have been made to 
liberate architectural theory from the rhetorical confine-
ment in which the real social content o f architecture is lost, 
and attention shifts to the formal expression o f buildings so 
that buildings are ultimately confused w i t h "a k ind o f large 
public sculpture" ( ibid.) . 
Markus has, by his comprehensive analyses, elucidated 
how social relations are reflected i n and reinforced by 
buildings' form, function and space, and how the meaning 
o f architecture can be understood through these multilate-
ral relations, (Markus 1993 and 1992). 
The fact that architectural theory, since its historical 
infancy, has been normative has led to the assumption that 
i t w i l l remain so for ever. Architectural theory has even been 
treated as mere rhetoric. Jerker Lundequist outlines the 
historic course o f architectural theories and concludes that 
these theories are hardly to be regarded as scientific, i f by 
scientific we mean an explanation of something; the theory 
of architecture is rhetorical not scientific 
(Lundequist 1992, p. 148) 
Then the important thing about these theories is to articu-
late them and clatify them as "points of view, which one can 
agree w i t h or oppose" (Lundequist 1992, p. 146 my em-
phasis). Hi l l ier argues that architectural theory specific to 
architecture aiming to explain architectural phenomena as 
well as to guide design does exist (Hill ier, 1993). The word 
'explain' implies that a scientific theory is envisaged, at least 
by Hil l ier . 
Hi l l ier proposes two essential crireria for identifying a 
scientific theory: "the internal structure o f i t must be clear; 
and the reference to phenomena must be clear" (Hi l l ier 
1993, p. 34). These two criteria create the possibility o f 
refutation, which he accepts as being central to the morality 
o f science. Hil l ier considers the difference between scientific 
theories and theories o f architecture to be not a difference 
i n type but i n clarity; architectural theories have lacked the 
two kinds o f clarity needed for refutability. "this is why 
theories o f architecture can be refuted by life, but not by 
analysis"(ibid.). 
The prevalent mode o f architectural theories have been 
normative rather than analytic. Hi l l ier explains that they, 
usually, have been presented as a set o f precepts w h i c h 
aims to guide design and show 'how the w o r l d should be' 
rather than 'how the wor ld is'. Therefore rhey seems to be 
exempted from the restricted rules that govern scientific 
theories. The preposition that architectural theories do 
come in normative mode does not fully exhaust their 
analytic content. Hi l l ier estimates all architectural theories 
to be somehow also analytic theories. This follows his defi-
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nition of architecture as an 'intrinsically theoretical act'. He 
shows how the evidence of not only 'systematic intent' but 
of 'theorerical intent' in buildings is associated with the 
very presence of architecture. Exactly this theoretical input 
is what distinguishes architecture - as something innovated 
and not reduplicated - from vernacular in it's sense as 
prevailing mode of building. 
Involvement of theory, in its sense as analytic thinking, 
in architecture has been acknowledged by many scholars. 
Lundequist, who is not much in agreement with his propo-
sition about the nature of architectural theory, admirs that 
we experience architecture as "something thought and plan-
ned' (Lundequist 1982, p. 1 79) . We may reformulate this 
statement as 'something which is the result of a theoretical 
intention Lundequist and Granarh refer to Donald Schon's 
theory of knowledge and describe the practice of archi-
tectural design as a reflective action. Reflective action 
implies that an action is associated with comparative and 
analytic thinking (Lundequist 1992 , p. 153, and Granath 
1991 , pp. 8 3 - 8 7 
Hillier acknowledges that 
theories from Alberti to Le Corbusier in fact make profound 
and far reaching assumptions about human nature, about per-
ception, about behaviour, as well as about the nature of 
architectural order 
(Hillier 1993, p. 34 , my emphasis) 
Lundequist estimates the tradition of architectural rheory 
in another way He writes: 
The tradition of architectural theory justifies certain methods, 
points of view and solutions and excludes others. This tradi-
tion, which extends from Vitruvius through the renaissance 
and baroque tracts to the manifesto of functionalism and up 
to the post-modernism and deconstruction of our time, can-
not be judged on the basis of criteria of truth or depth of 
thought. The interesting thing about these theories is their 
persuasive power, which they have evidently often had, on 
certain groups of people, during a specific epoch, under 
certain circumstances 
(Lundequist 1992 , p. 148) 
The theory of architecture in its scientific sense, I suggest, 
covers, without necessarily needing to justify or exclude any 
methods, points of view, or solutions, an area within which 
different solutions can be analysed. This analysis will be 
carried out by the means of the concepts and the methods 
that are developed within the theory itself and belong to it, 
and not to different solutions or viewpoints, which are to be 
analysed. In this sense, theory is impartial before any solu-
tion or viewpoint. Theory is supposed to be capable to eluci-
date what different solutions may, covertly, have in common, 
and what is special to each of them. It should explain the way 
in which different solutions affect people's life differently. In 
this way theory may also contribute to explain why certain 
points of view or solutions have had, under certain circum-
stances, such persuasive power on certain group of people. 
Despatialising society 
I would like to return to the discussion about the ways of 
thinking that exclude people from architecture. In this con-
nection I want to discuss another kind of exclusion which 
may also come up, but this time, in the reverse direction; 
the exclusion of space, which is an essential dimension of 
architecture, from people's life. In many studies of those 
dimensions of social life in which the built environment is 
directly involved, the issue of space is actually neglected. 
Factors like spatial structures and the interaction between 
the relational patrerns of built space and the patterns of so-
cial relations are nor taken into account when the process of 
emergence of cultural and social meanings is studied. There 
is a temptation to believe that meaning of place arises from 
the immanent patterns of social interaction independent 
from the structure of space. Even 'post-occupancy evalu-
ation' studies which are directly aimed at evaluating buil-
ding and urban layouts in order to enhance the design of 
future cases, non spatial factors are mostly invoked to 
explain the function or dysfunction of the spaces under 
consideration. 
To give some examples in this connection I would like to 
mention two implemented studies and draw attention to 
some conclusions in these studies. 
In one study of Skogshöjden, a neighbourhood near 
Trollhättan in Sweden, carried out in the School of Archi-
tecture of Chalmers University of Technology, it is con-
cluded that 
the cul-de-sacs though, which had the best physical condition 
for the feeling of room, had fewer social contacts than the 
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crescents. This is probably connected with the house type; 
the crescents had just small houses 
(Sundberg 1996, p. 6) 
It is noticeable that, in the neighbourhood's layour, the 
crescents are located i n spatially more properly integrated 
positions than the cul-de-sacs. This simple, spatial mor-
phological properry is not considered as a possible expla-
nation o f the greater socialisation recorded i n the crescents. 
A n organisational factor, namely house type, is used to 
explain why the more enclosed parts o f the layout (cul-de-
sacs) produced less observed socialisation than the cres-
cents, even though the lattet were considered unsafe, and 
even though the observed pattern was contrary to the 
designer's expectations. 
I n the other study which has been carried out i n relarion 
to different neighbourhoods in Brasilia, the same view is 
dominat ing throughout. For example, i t is observed that 
only in some o f the areas in the layout o f a neighbourhood 
which are supposed ro function as 'public squares' do the 
residents socialise: 
although in some blocks people socialise in these areas, in 
most othets they remain deserted 
The inference drawn from this observation is that 
this depends largely on the social action between the 
neighbours, which seems to be independent of the nature of 
the urban layout 
(Bauer 1997, p. 82, my emphasis) 
N o answer is given to the question: why are only some o f 
these areas used for socialisation? Have they been chosen 
tandomly by the people as centres o f social contacts, or do 
some o f these areas posses specific spatial properries that 
make them preferable for the functions o f socialisation? 
Confusion i n such k i n d o f studies arises from two kinds 
o f difficulty: methodological and theoretical; extracting 
the effect o f architecture (space) while control l ing for the 
effects o f complex social variables is difficult; and, concep-
tually, l ink ing sensory and mental events through which 
the physical mil ieu can somehow invade people's m i n d and 
influence their behaviour is difficult. These two kinds o f 
difficulty have been circumvented through a negation o f 
the whole effect o f space (physical mil ieu). Space, i f its exis-
tence is acknowledged at all, is considered as a neutral frame-
work for social and cultural forms. This view, perhaps 
unconsciously, functions like some k i n d o f 'blocking stra-
tegy'. I t hinders the growth o f architectural theory, exactly 
i n cases where the development o f such a theory is most 
justified. The problems which should be Treated w i t h i n the 
field o f architecture, and by the means o f theories and 
methods specific to architecture, are transferred into the 
field o f another discipline - that is sociology. Thus, actu-
ally, space related problems remain unsolved or wrongly 
tteated because their definitions remain obscure since they 
are not set in their proper theoretical context. 
The enigma of the relation 
of form to function 
I n all the issues discussed above, one essential problem o f 
architecture i.e. rhe relation o f form to function was involved 
either directly or indirectly. Neither the negation o f this re-
lat ion, nor its simplification as a matter o f l ink ing a cause to 
an effect can lead to any constructive result, since they do 
not allow neither tesearch nor design to proceed. We need a 
clearer definition o f this problem i f we are to achieve a better 
understanding o f the nature o f architectural design. I t is, 
therefore appropriate that we examine further viewpoints 
which touch upon this problem i n differenr ways. 
Some viewpoints seem to be oscillating between accep-
t ing or rejecting a k i n d o f relation between form and func-
t ion i n architecture. Lundequist states, i n one place, that " i t 
is meaningless to claim that the function is the cause o f the 
form" (Lundequist 1992, p. 148). To support this, he refers 
to architectural competitions where, w i t h one and the same 
program, there come as many proposals as there are entries. 
He goes further and stresses that "a description o f the func-
t ion is often an attempt to justify the form after the event" 
( ibid.) . One may conclude from this formulation that 
Lundequist does not believe in any relation between form 
and function. But one may also interpret his statement i n 
another way: i f the form can be justified by function even 
after the event, then there should exisr some k i n d o f relation 
between form and function. Lundequist states clearly, i n 
another place, that the precondition for developing o f 
theory and practice o f architecture is that "one rejects the 
belief that anything truthful can be said about the relation-
ship between form and function" (Lundequist 1992, p. 154). 
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Thus, the question of the relation of form to function is not 
thought to be irrelevant yet, it is not elucidated either. 
Further oscillation of opinions can be noted. Lundequist 
points out that the boundary of architecture with respect to 
funcrions is so uncertain that every imaginable building 
can function comparatively well, in relation to a number of 
different socially functional systems. He suggests that 
if a certain socially functional system functions in a certain 
built structure, this fact does not constitute a criterion for 
the truth of the building 
(Lundequist 1982, p. 175, unauthorised Translation) 
Lundequist quotes Lars Gustafsson: 
I have never encountered a system not functioning ...man 
possesses the ability to make everything function. That is the 
terrible thing 
(ibid., unauthorised translation) 
Thus, we can conclude that both authors claim that func-
rions may take place in whatever form and that the fitting 
of a function into a building does not justify the form of the 
building. According to them, there is no evidence of a 
systematic non-trivial relationship of form to function. 
We can deal with the relarion of form ro function in an-
other way by considering the idea of'loose fit' vs. 'tight fit' 
presented by Amos Rapoport. Lundequist agrees with Amos 
Rapoport in that man adapts to the environmenr and 
adapts the environment to himself (Lundequist 1982, 
p. 173, and Rapoport 1 9 6 9 , in Design methods in architec-
ture p. 142) . By referring to this fact, Lundequist like Rapo-
port, does not aim to reject the existence of a form-function 
relation, but the trivializing of the relation. His critique is 
focused on the idea of'tight fit' or as he mentions it "close 
fit -a one-to-one-relation between form and function", 
assigned to Christopher Alexander (Lundequist 1982, p. 
175). Since man can adapt to environment there should be 
more room for this adaptation. Rapoport, referring to Peter 
Cowan, argues that 
the more closely a design is tailored to a particular function 
the more quickly it becomes out of date 
(Rapoport ibid.) 
Instead of the idea of tight fit, Rapoport defends the idea of 
'loose fit' 
to enable adaptation, to allow ambiguity giving many 
meanings and hence complexity; and the possibility to 
personalise and territorialize 
(ibid.) 
I f we accept the obsolescence of a closely tailored design to a 
particular funcrion, this obsolescence may only happen 
because of the probable change of that particular function. 
Rapoport points out that the change of the context of a 
function also can cause misfit i.e. make a tightly fitted buil-
ding useless and out of date. A function in a new context is, 
in fact, a new function, or a changed function. Then the 
problem is only that a changed or a new 'function' will not 
fit into a 'form' which was designed for another function, or 
a function before its changing. Thus, the argument about 
obsolescence implies that there must exist some kind of re-
lation of form to function. 
The idea of'loose fit' offers no guide for design, since it 
leaves the puzzle of the mechanism which regulates the rela-
tion between form and function unsolved. I f 'loose fit' 
means the fit of a variety of functions into a designed form, 
then it denotes functional flexibility. To explain how 
functional flexibility can be possible, that is how function-
ally flexible form can be possible, Hillier suggests a distinc-
tion between specific function and generic function. The 
latter covers a range of functions like: movement, co-pre-
sence, encounter, awareness in built environment. Generic 
function, Hillier suggests, 
implies that what makes buildings functionally interchange-
able is what buildings must have in common spatially in or-
der to fulfil any function. The more generic function is suffi-
cient to account for spatial organisation in any particular 
case, the more we would expect functional flexibility 
(Hillier 1996 , p. 372 ) 
The concept of generic function has been discussed com-
prehensively by Hillier and his colleagues and is a basic 
constituent of the theories developed by them. Here it 
suffices to mention that generic functions transcend types 
and correlate with measurable morphological properties of 
spatial arrangements in buildings, or more generally, in the 
built environment (Hillier, Hanson, & Peponis 1984, Peponis 
1993 and Hillier 1 9 9 6 ) . 
Form-function relations may be neglected when one 
associates meaning directly with function independently of 
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form. Where form is so neglected, space is not excluded 
from the discussion o f social life i n buildings, but its rele-
vance is only treated indirecrly, rhrough dealing w i t h space 
use. Granath points out that "space undergoes metamor-
phosis as activities and / or social circumstances change" 
(Granath 1991, p. 55). Here, o f course, metamorphosis refers 
to the meaning o f space, not its configuration. I n buildings 
and cities, forms do not change w i t h the same pace that 
functions do. This can easily make us imagine that only 
functions are the source o f meaning. Granath refers to Swe-
dish Brazilian architect Frank Svensson and writes: 
Inasmuch as events and behaviour are dynamic, i.e. they 
change over time and space, all defined places, all wotks of 
architecture wil l change with the events and activities that 
take place in them 
(Granath 1991, p. 55) 
Granath infers from this not ion that architecture is not 
created once and for all by the architect, but is instead 
continuously transformed by the uses to which the works 
o f architecture are put. This proposition may raise again the 
problem o f how we identify architecture generally, i.e. what 
is to be considered as architecture (see the fifth page o f 
this article). 
We do not need to discuss this issue in depth, but we can 
raise some relevant questions: Are uses to be predicted at 
the stage o f design? H o w are the uses o f a bui lding, conside-
red as the generator o f meaning, related to spatial and 
physical form o f that bui ld ing i.e. how does conceiving the 
meaning o f the bui lding - the identity o f architecture i n the 
bui lding - involve the very building? 
Hillier argues that although a building without its social set-
up loses it's 'real meaning', we should not infer that the build-
ing is a mere physical appendage o f the social set-up. He writes: 
the fact that social set-up gives a meaning to the building is 
more than an association of ideas. Once a social set-up with it's 
building exists, then the building is much more than a stage 
set or background. In itself it transmits through its spatial and 
physical form key aspects of the form of the social set-up 
(Hi l l ier 1996, p. 397) 
Markus' statements is also relevant here. He writes: 
The buildings are more than passive containers for relations. 
Like all practices they are formative, as much through the 
things that happen in them, their functional programme, as 
by their spatial relations and their form 
(Markus 1993, p. 11) 
The shift o f function to new use is not always followed by 
the shift o f meaning automatically and wi thout contro-
versy. Markus has examined hisrorical cases to show the 
complicated interaction between form, function, space and 
meaning (Markus 1993, p. 2 9 - 3 3 ) . l n m s study we can find 
cases i n which meaning changes easily when there is con-
cordance between the new use, the new social circumstances, 
and the form and space o f a bui lding. But we can also find 
cases i n which the meaning o f the new function o f the bu i l -
ding refuses to converge w i t h that o f it's form and space. 
This conttadiction destroys the sense o f feeling at home 
and causes alienation. We can infer that i n such cases, 
meaning in it's integral entirety is missing, while function 
does not fit into the physical form and space o f rhe bui l -
ding. 
The design o f function 
The problem o f the form-function relation has also been 
discussed by researchers in other ways, i n connection to de-
sign. These are more impl ic i t , but at the same time more 
suggestive. I n one way or another, some authors talk about 
the design of function as a part o f the process o f architec-
tural design. I suggest that this way o f setting the problem 
can lead, to its further elucidation. 
Lundequist points out that architectural and urban de-
sign differ from other design practices i n that they also 
involve decisions about how the system o f the artefact 
should be used - that is the prescription o f a use for an 
artefact, (Lundequist 1982, p. 170 ). Lundequist quotes Pye: 
" I t is as though the civil engineer had not only to design a 
dam, but first o f all to design the water" ( ibid.) . The archi-
tect's particular problem is, Lundequist suggests, to design 
both form and function. He considers architecture as a 
divided and structured space i n which not only physical 
artefacts, but also functions and functional telationships 
must be distributed ( ibid.) . 
John Peponis considers the design o f function as an i m -
plication o f form. He recognises that design involves 
' formulation', that is the exploration o f possibilities in the 
field o f architectural form aimed at aesthetic aims. Peponis 
refers to Le Corbusier's famous formulation o f design alter-
140 NORDISK ARKITEKTURFORSKNING 1998:4 
natives derived from the domino house principle, to exemp-
lify this. He suggests, however, rhat function can also be 
brought within the purview of formulation. Here function 
is not equated with specialised requirements; rather, the ar-
gument concerns general function based on the inherent 
properties of spatial morphologies. Function and aesthetics 
become integrated in the same process of formulation. 
Peponis writes of architecture: 
The modulation of the reciprocal relationship of the gaze 
through the arrangement of boundaries and connections lies 
at the foundations not only of its social function but also of 
its aesthetics 
(Peponis 1993, p .61) 
The problem of the design of function may remain 
obscure, but , at least, we have got the notion that there 
must be some common, objective and measurable properties 
in functions as well as in forms, though they, seemingly, 
belong to different logical categories. These properties 
must be representative and objective enough so that as we 
conceive of them the design of functions becomes more and 
more tangible. Furthermore, and they must be common 
enough to both form and function, so as to make it 
possible that the design of the one implies the other. This 
notion will become clearer, and then more plausible, i f we 
norice that the properries in quesrion are morphological 
i.e. concern relarional patterns within entities. 
It seems that we can go ahead in probing the problem 
of form-function relation. We however need more preci-
sion and explicitness in our discussion to proceed. I 
would like to have recourse to Hillier's statement; "Archi-
tects design form, but hope for function" (Hillier 1 9 9 6 , p. 
4 2 4 ) . The point here is that this hope is not contingent, 
but depends on predictable probabilities. Its coming into 
being coincides with the emergence of the design; it is not 
a by-product of the design, it is the design itself. Archi-
tecrural design, over and above creativity, involves predic-
tability. This predictability, in its specific sense, is charac-
teristic of architecture and distinguishes it from other 
arts. Hillier writes: 
A design is therefore not only a prediction of an object, rat-
her an object itself, but, however functionally non-specific it 
claims to be, a prediction of people in relation to building 
( Hillier 1 9 9 6 , p. 6 4 , my emphasis) 
Art or science? 
Creativity, in architecture, requires theories in the sense in 
which they exist in art, i.e. theories which seek knowledge 
of ever-widening possibility in exploring forms of expres-
sion and representation. Prediction, in architecture, requires 
analyric theories, analogous to scientific theories, which 
seeks knowledge of actuality as well as possibility. Without 
the addition of prediction, the practice of architectural de-
sign is rendered nonsense and architecture is reduced to 
sculpture. The question is how can we apply these two kind 
of theories in one and rhe same pracrice. Is it possible to see 
in architectural design two contrary aspects, i.e. technical 
and artistic, and treat these two aspects separately? 
Looking at what art is about, and at what distinguishes 
architecture from other arts, may give us the answer to 
these questions. Lundequist refers to Langer and Cassirer 
and suggests that a work of art is a representation of a hu-
man emotional experience. A form of art is a form of know-
ledge. It does not mediates feelings but knowledge about 
the structure of feelings. This knowledge can not be trans-
ferred in discursive form. It takes, instead, its form as a 
symbolic representation, a picture of the experienced real-
ity. Art complements language as a medium of knowledge 
and mediates in forms of undersranding that cannot be 
mediated by the discursive qualities of language. The work 
of art is a created, complex entirety. The material or Techni-
ques used in the process of the work's creation is only its raw 
material (Lundequist 1982) . 
Hillier also refers to Ernst Cassirer bur stresses the argu-
ment developed by the latter when comparing art to sci-
ence. This revolves around the idea of art as concretion. He 
writes: 
Language and science are abbreviations of reality; art is an 
intensification of reality. Language and science depend on 
one and the same process of abstraction; art may be 
described as a continuous process of concretion 
(Cassirer 1944 , here from Hillier 1996 , p. 8 4 ) 
But what can we say about architecture? Hillier includes ar-
chitecture in the latter definition; "architecture is like art a 
continuous process of concretion", and as such, "like art, its 
aspects are innumerable" - art is not an abbreviarion of 
reality. But there are also differences, Hillier writes: 
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The thing 'whose aspects are innumerable' is not a represen-
tation but a reality, and a very special kind of reality, one 
through which our forms of social being are transformed 
and put at risk 
(Hil l ier 1996, p. 85) 
How, then, should we deal w i t h the two kinds o f theories, 
i.e. theories o f possibility related to the realm o f art, and 
analytic theories o f actuality, as well as o f possibility related 
to the realm of science, which are required in architectural 
design for the purposes o f prediction? H o w can we integrate 
them, or the knowledge pertaining to them, i n the process 
o f design? There already exist integrated rheories. Good 
analytic theories, Hi l l ier suggests, ate already likely to be 
also good theories o f possibility, (Hil l ier 1996, p. 64). The 
analytic theories, he argues, do not only describe the w o r l d 
as i t is but also describe the l imits o f how i t can be. 
How design involves theory 
O u r recognition o f our reliance upon scientific theories 
does not solve the problem o f the relation o f rhe rheory to 
the practice o f design. I f we simplify the problem we may 
naively suggest that theory serves to guide the whole route 
i n a design process and that i f theoretical prescriptions are 
followed i n a step by step manner, they w i l l lead the desig-
ner to the desired end. This naive argument has been 
rejected long ago, not only by theoreticians, but also by life, 
because i t is not concordant w i t h the nature o f design. The 
naive view o f rhe application o f theory to design implies a 
process which is more akin to the process o f production. I n 
actuality, the greater complexity o f the problem lies i n what 
distinguishes creation from production. W h a t is created is 
something new. Its components, its entirety and the inner 
relations berween rhe componenrs had no existence before. 
By contrast, i n mechanical assembly the components are 
given, already existing; or, they arise as a result o f a transforma-
t ion o f something already given, (Langer 1957, pp. 27-28). 
Because design is an activity which aims to create some-
thing, theory does not related to i t only in the sense o f an 
'application' to design practice. Design involves theory 
directly, over and above technical knowledge. Lundequist 
argues that there is an epistemological mistake in Christop-
her Alexander's rheory o f good fit, namely the idea that the 
activity o f design can and should be transformed into a 
scientific activity. Such a view confuses the task o f a theory 
w i t h the task o f practice. Design process is, according to 
Lundequist, a practice, a societal process in a given social 
context. Lundequist argues that this process, i n itself, can 
never be transformed to a scientific discipline (Lundequist 
1982, p. 174,175). I f we consider architectural design as an 
analytic act, however, do we also have to accept that design, 
per se, participates i n the definition o f a scientific activity -
that is an activity which aims at producing theories or, at 
least, at making the existing theories clearer? 
Pye considers design as a unity o f two contrary elements; 
arr and technique. He distinguishes the technique-related 
work which is performed to solve technical and functional 
problems, from art-related work in design. Pye calls the lat-
ter 'useless work' - work wirhout util itarian and practical 
goal (Pye 1978, p. 43, 77, 90). According ro Pye this 'useless 
work' dose not aim at usefulness, economy, accessibility 
etc, but is only performed to achieve aesthetic or ethical aims. 
But architecture is defined as both art and science not 
because i t has both technical-functional, and aesthetic 
aspects, but because i t involves both the process o f abstrac-
t ion by which we know science, and the process o f concre-
t ion which is characteristic o f art. Hi l l ier asserts that archi-
tecture is an intrinsically theoretical act, (Hill ier 1993, p. 13). 
But he also considers architecture as an art, and suggests 
that architecture is a theoretical concretion (Hillier 1996, p. 85). 
Hi l l ier defines rhe task o f architects in accordance w i t h this 
view of architecture. He writes: 
Architects are enjoined both to create the new, since that is 
the nature of their task, but also to render the theories which 
tie their creation to our social existence better and clearer. It 
is that makes architecture distinct and unique 
(ibid.) 
Knowledge based freedom 
and constraints 
Scientific theories may be refured or be replaced by better 
ones. But the process o f creating new theories never stops. 
I f we consider architectural design as a theoretical act, i n its 
scientific sense, then, logically, design must not be restricted 
intrinsically. Constraints do not, in fact, lie in design itself, 
but i n the object o f design i n its social context. Thus, we 
need to answet the question o f whether design is possible or 
not, i.e. i f i t is possible to resist cultural and bureaucratic 
suppression or not. To understand restrictions and freedom 
142 NORDISK ARKITEKTURFORSKNING 1998:4 
in design we need to understand the properties of the built 
world, of the architectural object, of functions, of social life, 
and, last but not least, of the mechanism through which 
these are related to each other, that is to understand human 
spatial existence. On which form of knowledge does this 
understanding depend? 
Hillier makes a distinction between two, functionally 
different, forms of knowledge regarding our awareness or 
unawareness of the relation of concrete cases (spatio-tem-
poral phenomena) to abstract principles(e.g. rule systems) 
which bring them together into meaningful patterns. He 
calls them 'social knowledge' and analytic or scientific 
knowledge. In 'social knowledge' we must know "... some-
thing abstract in order to be able to do, or to relate to, 
something concrete" (Hillier 1997 , p. 2 4 6 ) . We acquire this 
knowledge of abstractions not explicitly and indepen-
dently but practically through applying it in the process of 
generating or experiencing concrete cases. This is to know 
how to behave socially and recognise social behaviours in 
the presence of culture. Since we learn how to do thing by 
doing, abstract principles become covertly embedded in 
the habit of doing and work below the level of conscious-
ness. Hence they are protected from being examined or 
changed every time they are applied to concrete cases. They 
are conserved to function as the normative basis of social 
praxis. In contrast to social knowledge, in analytic or scien-
tific knowledge we learn explicitly defined abstract princip-
les, through which we grasp concrete cases, consciously. 
The explicitness of these abstracrions and our awareness of 
principles both when we acquire the knowledge and when 
we use it to interpret concrete cases keep them at the level of 
conscious thought which make it possible to examine them 
and i f necessary to reconstitute them. Analytic knowledge 
is in fact a continuous process of testing and producing 
knowledge. 
When we use social knowledge to evaluate concrete 
cases that we generate or confront we tend to resort to 
concrete precedents instead of abstract principles. Under 
the dominance of social knowledge we are confined in a si-
tuation that we only move on the surface of concrete 
particularities and remain unaware of underlying abstract 
generalities. We do not understand the principles that 
make cases intelligible and comparable. To escape this state 
of confinement and unawareness we can not trust social 
knowledge itself since this form of knowledge works as the 
normative basis of customary modes of behaviour. Analytic 
knowledge can be the 'rescuer' since its purpose is "to 
understand the world rarher than to behave in it" (Hillier 
1 9 9 6 , p. 41) , and since this knowledge works just so long 
that abstract principles are exposed ro conscious thought in 
order to be explicitly explained and used as well as to be 
changed. We can suggest that our understanding should be 
based on analytic knowledge. Specifically in connection to 
architecture it seems reasonable to associate this form of 
knowledge with freedom. Analytic knowledge/theory is, as 
Hillier defines it, 
the precondition of the liberation of architecture from the 
social knowledge which dominates vernacular design and 
which continually threatens architecture with bureaucratic 
extinction through typological guidance 
(Hillier 1996 , p. 4 4 5 ) 
Social knowledge on the contrary can be associared with 
constraints. In the presence of social knowledge, as Hillier 
argues, 
the spatial conditions exist for all kinds of conservation - of 
roles and positions, of social praxes and rituals, of status and 
identities 
whereas in the absence of social knowledge 
the spatial conditions exist for all kinds of generation - new 
relationships, new ideas, new products, and even knowledge 
(Hillier 1 9 9 6 , p. 2 4 8 ) 
This generation of new relationship has particularly been a 
case in point. 
Markus estimates, in a somehow pessimistic way, that 
a typology based on relations - not only of people but 
between them and knowledge and things - is not yet at reach 
(Markus 1993, p. 38) 
Evidently he does not have in mind the concept of relation in 
its general sense since all typologies, any way, are based on 
some kind of relations. One can simply infer from the con-
text of his argument (Markus 1993, pp. 1 0 and 38, 1992 pp. 
4 6 - 4 7 ) that he is concerned with a typology based on specific 
kind of relations. Markus distinguishes two kinds of human 
relations. The first depends on social role and power 
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structures. The other, he calls bonds, which are beyond and 
in some way the opposites o f socially constituted relations 
(Markus 1993, p. 10). Markus' pessimisric view regarding the 
impossibility o f relational typologies linked to the making o f 
bonds is inconsistent w i t h his recommendation regarding 
'design by subversion' that I mentioned at the beginning o f 
my article. I f there is any possibility for architects to follow a 
subversive strategy i n design, a strategy that aims at breaking 
bounds (say established norms) to enhance the blossoming 
of bonds (say ethic), this possibility can only arise through 
the mediation o f testable theoretical knowledge. Because 
only this knowledge enables designers, to predict the outline 
o f the probable social outcome of their design, in the absence 
of definite precedent and cultural conformity. 
O f course all human spatial organisations involve, to 
some extent, social knowledge i n the sense discussed above. 
It is not the mere involvement but the predominance o f so-
cial knowledge, when i t tends to monopolise the determi-
nation o f all relationships and meanings, that causes stag-
nation in design activity. Architectural design is predo-
minantly practised not in direct conflict w i t h social know-
ledge or established cultural norms and values bur ar a 
lower level w i r h i n rhe leeway left by them. 
Hi l l ier suggests that all human spatial arrangements pass 
through a series o f three functional filters (Hil l ier 1996, p. 
330). The firsr filter; generic functions, covers the proper-
ties which all spatial arrangements must have in order to be 
usable and intelligible to human beings at all. The second 
filter; cultural intent, forms culrurally defined types, or by 
definit ion, cultural genotypes. The t h i r d filter is the level o f 
specific buildings. This filter covers individual differences 
in buildings where they are not specified by cultural geno-
types. These filters depend on each other and work i n suc-
cession. I n other words, each filter works w i t h i n the 
constraints set at the former level/levels. This means that 
cultural genotypes work w i t h i n l imits set by generic func-
tion and the th i rd level filter, the one o f specific buildings, 
works w i t h i n the limits set by cultural genotypes. Where 
variations i n specific buildings are allowed by cultural 
genotypes they do not transcend the l imits o f generic func-
tions but their emergence follows the laws governing the 
generic functions o f all spatial structures. 
Variations ar the level o f specific buildings may be the 
outcome o f a random process. But i n the case that they are 
not, they are inrended and structured; they are the outcome 
o f reflective thought. To put i t in a nutshell, design is 
involved i n their emergence. I f design is to overcome the 
mere reproduction o f cultural types surface knowledge 
about norms does not suffice. Furthermore, the absence o f 
exact precedents and precise prescriptive guidance means 
that prediction can only be based upon establishing a mutual 
logical relation between culturally defined functions and 
corresponding spatial structures. The theory o f architec-
ture should facilitate this insight which i n its turn w i l l 
enrich the theory through rhe practice o f design. 
To the extent that cultural genotypes allow variations 
they are themselves susceptible to evolution. Inventive crea-
t ion o f phenorypic varianrs, which involves design, is an act 
o f seeking new possibilities i n formal and spatial arrange-
ments to fulfi l new social functions as the ceaseless flow o f 
life demands. This act o f seeking, practically, confronrs and 
reveals the hidden obstacles that established systems o f 
norms put on the way o f blossoming o f our life wor ld . Re-
velation o f obstacles and constraints is i n fact the first step 
i n overcoming and transcending them. L imited freedom i n 
design, i f used consciously i n the light o f theoretically 
analytic knowledge, can lead and has often led to changes 
i n the norms that restrict this freedom. Thus design, in its 
nature, can be regarded as an emancipating action, though 
w i t h a reformatory character. 
Markus argues that 
one of the most disot ientating aspects of recent architecture 
is that some of its spatial and formal inventions are not 
nameable 
(Markus 1993, p. 12) 
I suppose that he means that these inventions are not 
associated w i t h any existing or prospective social functions 
which have already been assigned a name, or might be 
assigned a name i n the future. He does not mean that all 
invented forms and spaces should have a name i n advance. 
Assigned names convey prevailing social meanings. Arch i -
tecture does not only convey social meanings. I t participa-
tes in their generation. Architecture is not confined w i t h i n 
the realm of names. I t precedes them. This is possible because 
our ability to recognise and understand configurations, 
generally, and spatial configurations more specifically, is 
prior to the assignment o f names (Hil l ier 1996, p. 39). 
144 NORDISK ARKITEKTURFORSKNING 1998:4 
The generation of spatial configurations has aesthetic 
relevance, i f these configurations are to convey architec-
tutal experiences. Prior to words, aesthetic intuition is 
involved. Using Hillier's terminology, social meaning, 
related to culturally defined functions of spaces, is the 
realm of constraints, while spatial aesthetic is the realm of 
freedom (Hillier 1993) . But the spatial aesthetic is not an 
end in itself. It relates to social functions in a unique way. 
It is the means which, free from culrural habits, is used to 
re-contextualise social intentions. There is no other means 
that distinguishes architecture from culturally pro-
grammed and habitually produced buildings. Thus 
aesthetic work, becomes an indispensable work in 
creation of architecture, and not a 'useless' work as 
claimed by Pye. 
Spatial aesthetic and social functions are inextricably 
intertwined. This is due to the way that architecture appears 
as a social art. As Hillier formulates it, 
architecture is a social art because the primary material of the art 
- the field of configurational possibility for space and form - is 
also the means by which buildings have intrinsic social conrents 
(Hillier 1 9 9 6 , p. 4 4 4 ) 
Spatial aesthetic carries social potentials on the basis of general 
laws governing relations between spatial and social forms. 
Thus aesthetic work can not dispense theoretical knowledge 
about these laws. Social potentials carried by spatial aesthetic, 
i f realised, would be the embodiment of specific ethical 
concepts. Architecture, in its entirety, can be considered as the 
locus of manifestation of the unity of ethic and aesthetic. 
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